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21. INTRODUCTION
The use of fundamental and technical analysis by financial market professionals is well doc-
umented.1 Empirical evidence suggests that investors and fund managers use combinations of
fixed and switching strategies based on fundamental and technical analysis when making in-
vestment decisions. Recent laboratory experiments (e.g. Hommes et al., 2005 and Anufriev
and Hommes, 2012) provide further evidence that agents use simple “rule of thumb” trading
strategies and are able to coordinate on a common prediction rule, showing that heterogene-
ity in expectations is crucial to describe individual forecasting and aggregate price behavior.
Many heterogeneous agent models based on investors’ behavior of using fixed and, in particu-
lar, switching strategies can replicate volatility clustering and long range dependence in return
volatility. However, an empirical test of such switching model is still a challenging task. This
paper is aimed to address this challenge.
In this paper, we empirically test a simple asset pricing model of heterogeneous agents using
both fixed and switching strategies and show that the model is able to characterize the power-
law behavior of the daily DAX 30 index from 1975 to 2007. More explicitly, we show that the
market is dominated by investors who constantly switch between fundamental and trend fol-
lowing strategies, although some investors never change their strategies over time. The results
provide strong support to the empirical evidence and laboratory experiments. Consequently,
we provide a different insight into the explanatory power of heterogeneous agent models to
financial markets.
This paper is largely motivated by the recent literature on heterogeneity and bounded rational-
ity. Due to limited information and endogenous uncertainty of the state of the world, investors
are prevented from forming and solving life-time optimization problems in favor of more sim-
ple reasoning and rules of thumb (Shefrin, 2005). In general, investors are boundedly ratio-
nal by making optimal decisions based on their limited information and expectations (Sargent,
1993). There is growing evidence of investors’ heterogeneity and bounded rationality, which
has profound consequences for the interpretation of empirical evidence and the formulation of
economic policy (Heckman, 2001). Research into asset pricing and financial market dynam-
ics resulting from bounded rationality and interaction of adaptively heterogeneous traders has
1See, for example, Allen and Taylor (1990), Taylor and Allen (1992), Menkhoff (1998) and Cheung et al., (2004)
for foreign exchange rate markets, and Menkhoff (2010) for fund managers.
3flourished over the last three decades and various heterogeneous agent models (HAMs) have
been developed.2 To explore the role of agents’ heterogeneity in financial markets, the market
dominance of different trading strategies represented by different types of traders plays a central
role in market price behavior. It has been modelled either implicitly by examining their relative
activity impacts, such as Day and Huang (1990) and Chiarella (1992) in early literature, or ex-
plicitly by examining their market fractions, such as Lux (1995), Brock and Hommes (1998),
and Dieci, Foroni, Gardini and He (2006). The HAMs have successfully explained market
booms, crashes, and deviations of the market price from the fundamental price. They are also
able to replicate various stylized facts (including excess volatility, excess skewness, fat tails,
volatility clustering and power-law behavior in return volatility) observed in financial markets.3
The promising perspectives of the HAMs have motivated further empirical studies. Focusing
on the model of Dieci et al. (2006), which allows for agents either having fixed strategies or
switching their strategies based on past performance over time, we extend the model to include
noise traders to rationalize the market noise in the model, which plays a very important role
in explaining the power-law behavior. Our main contribution is to calibrate systematically a
number of structural parameters of the model and subsequently perform series of formal econo-
metric tests, showing that the calibrated model with both fixed and switching strategies is well
able to replicate a large number of stylized facts. We therefore provide a different insight into
the explanatory power of rational switching behavior of investors on the volatility clustering
and long range dependence in return volatility.
This paper is closely related to a growing literature on the calibration and estimation of the
HAMs in which the heterogeneity has been modeled through the well-known fundamentalists
and chartists approach. These models have been successfully used to empirically explain spec-
ulation and bubble-like behavior in financial markets.4 He and Li (2015) estimate a simple
2See, for example, Frankel and Froot (1990), Day and Huang (1990), Chiarella (1992), Lux (1995, 1998), Brock
and Hommes (1998), Lux and Marchesi (1999), Hommes (2001), Chen and Yeh (2002), Farmer and Joshi (2002),
Chiarella et al. (2002), Chiarella and He (2002, 2003), and De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006).
3We refer the reader to Hommes (2006), LeBaron (2006), Chiarella et al. (2009), Lux (2009b), and Chen et al.
(2012) for surveys of recent developments in this literature.
4See, for instance, earlier works by Vigfusson (1997), Baak (1999), Chavas (2000), and, for stock markets (Boswijk
et al., 2007; Franke, 2009; Franke and Westerhoff, 2011, 2012; Chiarella et al., 2012, 2014; He and Li, 2015),
foreign exchange markets (Westerhoff and Reitz, 2003; De Jong et al., 2010; ter Ellen et al., 2013), mutual funds
(Goldbaum and Mizrach, 2008), option markets (Frijns et al., 2010), oil markets (ter Ellen and Zwinkels, 2010),
and sovereign European CDS markets (Chiarella et al., 2015). Also, HAMs have been estimated with contagious
interpersonal communication by Gilli and Winker (2003), Alfarano et al. (2005), Lux (2009a, 2012), and other
works reviewed in Li et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2012).
4market fraction asset pricing model with heterogenous agents in which agents use fixed strate-
gies (without switching). For the estimated model, we show that the autocorrelations (of returns,
absolute returns and squared returns) of the market fraction model share the same pattern and
the power-law behaviors as those of the DAX 30. The results strongly support the explanatory
power of the heterogeneous agents models. However, whether switching models can be tested
empirically to explain volatility clustering and power-law behavior is less clear. For exam-
ple, Amilon (2008) estimates two specifications of the extended Brock and Hommes switching
models described in De Grauwe and Grimaldi (2006). He concludes that the simple prototype
models he estimated seems to have potential to explain empirical facts, however the fit is gener-
ally not quite satisfactory. Intuitively, with rational switching behavior of investors, we would
expect switching models to work better empirically. The difficulties come from the nonlinearity
and complexity of the HAMs, together with many parameters.5 Following Li et al. (2010) and
He and Li (2015), we take the weak econometric interpretation of Geweke (2006) based on the
power-law decay patterns of the autocorrelation of returns, the squared returns and the absolute
returns for the DAX 30 stock market daily closing price index. We do this by choosing the
interesting parameters in the whole model class that minimize the distance between particular
actual data based autocorrelations and HAMs based autocorrelations. Different from He and Li
(2015), we model the switching behavior of some investors, in addition to other investors who
use fixed strategies. By conducting econometric analysis via Monte Carlo simulations of the
model with estimated parameters, we show that the autocorrelation patterns, the estimates of the
power-law decay indices, (FI)GARCH parameters, and tail index of the model match closely to
the corresponding estimates for the DAX 30. Our results therefore provide strong support to the
empirical evidence on the popularity of fundamental and technical analysis, boundedly rational
and adaptive switching behavior of investors in financial markets.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reformulates the adaptive asset pricing model
developed in Dieci et al. (2006) to include noise traders. Section 3 calibrates the model to
characterize the power-law behavior of the DAX 30. We also conduct formal tests to see how
well the calibrated model is able to describe the characteristics of the DAX 30. Section 4
presents an explanation on the generating mechanism of the power-law behavior of the model.
Section 5 concludes.
5We refer to He and Li (2015) for a detailed discussion of these issues.
52. THE MODEL
Empirical evidence (Allen and Taylor, 1990 and Taylor and Allen, 1992) suggests that the
proportions of agents relying on particular strategies, such as technical and fundamental anal-
ysis, may vary over time, although there are certain confident agents who do not change their
strategy over time. Menkhoff (2010) analyzes survey evidence from 692 fund managers in five
countries. He finds that the share of fund managers that put at least some importance on tech-
nical analysis is very large. Though technical analysis does not dominate the decision-making
of fund managers in general, at a forecasting horizon of weeks, Menkhoff finds that technical
analysis is the most important form of analysis and is thus more important than fundamental
analysis, which is in line with findings from foreign exchange in Menkhoff (1998) and Cheung
et al. (2004). Menkhoff (2010) strongly supports the view that heterogeneous agents have dif-
ferent sets of information or different beliefs about market processes. Also the use of technical
analysis seems to react to this view with trend-following behavior (and also by relying more
strongly on momentum and contrarian investment strategies), believing that psychological fac-
tors are important and herding is beneficial. This view has also been shared by recent laboratory
experiments in Hommes et al. (2005) and Anufriev and Hommes (2012). They show that agents
using simple “rule of thumb” trading strategies are able to coordinate on a common prediction
rule. Therefore, heterogeneity in expectations and the adaptive behavior are crucial to describe
individual forecasting and aggregate price behavior.
Based on the empirical evidence, Dieci et al. (2006) extend early HAMs of Brock and
Hommes (1998) by considering a more general setup that market fractions have both fixed and
adaptive switching components. In each trading period agents are assumed to be distributed
among two groups, relying upon different predictors (or strategies, or behavioral rules), funda-
mental traders (or fundamentalists) and trend followers (or chartists). The market fractions in
a given period are partially determined by the past performance of the strategies over time and
partially fixed. In other words, a switching component is introduced to characterize adaptively
rational behavior of agents who choose different strategies over time according to their perfor-
mance. A constant component of agents is used to represent agents who are confident and stay
with their strategies over time. While the fixed fraction component expresses the market mood,
the switching fraction component captures the effect of evolutionary adaption.
6The focus of Dieci et al. (2006) is to explore the complicated price dynamics of the corre-
sponding nonlinear deterministic model, while the focus of this paper is on the empirical testing
of the model to characterize the power-law behavior of the DAX 30. To calibrate the model, we
find that the additive market noise plays an important role. To rationalize the additive market
noise, apart from the fundamentalists and trend followers in the model of Dieci et al. (2006), we
also introduce noise traders who play an important role in financial market (see, for example,
Delong et al. 1990). We show that the resulting model is actually the same as the model of
Dieci et al. (2006) with market noise.
Consider an asset pricing model with one risky asset and one risk free asset that is assumed
to be perfectly elastically supplied at gross return R = 1 + r/K, where r is the constant
risk free rate per annum and K is the frequency of trading period per year. Let pt be the (ex
dividend) price per share of the risky asset and {Dt} the stochastic dividend process of the risky
asset at time t. There are three types of traders (or investors/agents), fundamental traders (or
fundamentalists), trend followers (or chartists) and noise traders, denoted by type 1, 2 and 3
traders, respectively. Let Qi,t(i = 1, 2, 3) be their market fractions at time t, respectively. We
assume that there is a fixed fraction of noise traders, denoted by n3. Among 1− n3, the market
fractions of the fundamentalists and trend followers have fixed and time varying components.
Denote by n1 and n2 the fixed proportions of fundamentalists and trend followers among 1−n3,
respectively. Then (1 − n3)(n1 + n2) represents the proportion of traders who stay with their
strategies over time, while (1− n3)[1− (n1 + n2)] is the proportion of traders who may switch
between the two types. Among the “switching” traders, we denote n1,t and n2,t = 1 − n1,t the
proportions of fundamentalists and trend followers at time t, respectively. It follows that the
market fractions (Q1,t, Q2,t, Q3,t) at time t are expressed by
Q1,t = (1−n3)[n1+(1−n1−n2)n1,t], Q2,t = (1−n3)[n2+(1−n1−n2)n2,t], Q3,t = n3.
Denote n0 = n1 + n2, m0 = (n1 − n2)/n0 and mt = n1,t − n2,t. Then the market fractions at
time t can be rewritten as

Q1,t =
1
2
(1− n3) [n0 (1 +m0) + (1− n0) (1 +mt)] ,
Q2,t =
1
2
(1− n3) [n0 (1−m0) + (1− n0) (1−mt)] ,
Q3,t = n3
(2.1)
7Let Rt+1 := pt+1 + Dt+1 − Rpt be the excess return per share in (t, t + 1). For h = 1, 2,
let Eh,t and Vh,t be the conditional expectation and variance of type h traders. Let Wh,t be
investor’s wealth at time t and zh,t the number of shares of the risky asset held by the investor
from t to t + 1. Then the wealth of investor of type h at t + 1 is given by Wh,t+1 = RWh,t +
zh,t(pt+1 +Dt+1 −Rpt). Assume that traders maximize the expected utility of wealth function
Uh(W ) = − exp(−ahW ), where ah is the risk aversion coefficient of type h traders. Then,
under the standard conditional normality assumption, the demand zh,t of a type h trader on the
risky asset is given by zh,t = Eh,t(Rt+1)/(ahVh,t(Rt+1)).
Assume the demand of the noise traders is given by ξt ∼ N(0, σ2ξ ), which is an i.i.d. random
variable. With zero supply of outside shares, the population weighted average excess demand
Ze,t at time t is given by
Ze,t ≡ Q1,t z1,t +Q2,t z2,t + n3ξt.
Following Chiarella and He (2003), the market price in each trading period is determined by
a market maker6 who adjusts the price as a function of the excess demand. The market maker
takes a long position when Ze,t < 0 and a short position when Ze,t > 0. The market price is
adjusted according to
pt+1 = pt + λZe,t, (2.2)
where λ denotes the speed of price adjustment of the market maker. Denote µ = (1− n3)λ and
σδ = λn3σξ. Then equation (2.2) becomes
pt+1 = pt + µZe,t + δt, (2.3)
where Ze,t = q1,t z1,t + q2,t z2,t and δt ∼ N(0, σ2δ ) with qi,t = Qi,t/(1 − n3) for i = 1, 2. The
price equation (2.3) is exactly the model developed in Dieci et al. (2006).
For completeness, we now describe briefly the heterogeneous beliefs of the fundamentalists
and trend followers and the adaptive switching mechanism and refer the readers to Dieci et al.
(2006) and He and Li (2008, 2015) for the details. Fundamental traders are assumed to have
some information on the fundamental value p∗t+1 of the risky asset at time t.7 They believe
6Different from the Walrasian equilibrium price mechanism used in Boswijk et al. (2007), we use market maker
partial equilibrium mechanism for the convenience of calibration. The market maker mechanism has often been
used in HAMs for its simplicity and convenience.
7There is a subtle difference in the information about the fundamental values among investors. For these in-
vestors who have fixed strategies, only the fundamentalists, not the trend followers, have information about the
fundamental value. This is the assumption made in the market fraction model of He and Li (2015). However,
8that the stock price may be driven away from the fundamental price in the short run, but it
will eventually return to the fundamental value in the long-run. Thus the conditional mean and
variance of the price for the fundamental traders are assumed to follow
E1,t (pt+1) = pt + (1− α)(p∗t+1 − pt), V1,t (pt+1) = σ21 , (2.4)
where σ21 is a constant variance on the price. The speed of adjustment towards the fundamental
price is represented by (1 − α), where 0 < α < 1. An increase in α may thus indicate less
confidence on the convergence to the fundamental price, leading to a slower adjustment.
Unlike the fundamental traders, trend followers are assumed to extrapolate the latest observed
price deviation from a long run sample mean price. More precisely, their conditional mean and
variance are assumed to follow
E2,t (pt+1) = pt + γ (pt − ut) , V2,t (pt+1) = σ21 + b2vt, (2.5)
where γ ≥ 0 measures the extrapolation from the trend, ut and vt are sample mean and variance,
respectively, which follow
ut = δut−1 + (1− δ) pt, vt = δvt−1 + δ (1− δ) (pt − ut−1)2 ,
representing limiting processes of geometric decay processes when the memory lag tends to
infinity.8 Here b2 ≥ 0 measures the sensitivity to the sample variance and δ ∈ (0, 1) measures
the geometric decay rate. Note that a constant variance is assumed for the fundamentalists who
believe the mean reverting of the market price to the fundamental price, while a time-varying
component of the variance for the trend followers reflects the extra risk they take by chasing the
trend.
We now specify how traders compute the conditional variance of the dividendDt+1 and of the
excess return Rt+1 over the trading period. For simplicity, we assume that traders share homo-
geneous beliefs about the dividend process and that the trading period dividend Dt is i.i.d. and
normally distributed with mean D¯ and variance σ2D. The common estimate of the variance of the
for those investors who are switching between the fundamentalists and trend followers, the information about the
fundamental value is known, which is the common assumption on the switching HAMs.
8With a geometric decaying probability distribution (1 − δ){1, δ, δ2, δ3, · · · } over the historical prices
{pt, pt−1, pt−2, pt−3, · · · , }, ut and vt are the corresponding sample mean and variance. See He (2003) for a
detailed discussion of the process.
9dividend (σ2D) is assumed to be proportional to the variance of the fundamental price, with no
correlation between price and dividend. It follows that traders’ conditional variances of the ex-
cess return can be estimated9 as V1,t (Rt+1) = (1 + r2)σ21 and V2,t (Rt+1) = σ21 (1 + r2 + bvt),
where b = b2/σ21 . Denote by p∗ = D¯/(R − 1) = (K/r)D¯ the long-run fundamental price.
Using (2.4) and (2.5), it turns out that traders’ optimal demands are determined by
z1,t =
(α− 1) (pt − p∗t+1)− (R− 1) (pt − p∗)
a1 (1 + r2)σ21
, z2,t =
γ (pt − ut)− (R− 1) (pt − p∗)
a2σ21 (1 + r
2 + bvt)
.
(2.6)
Denote by πh,t+1 the realized profit, or excess return, between t and t + 1 by traders of type
h, πh,t+1 = zh,t(pt+1 + Dt+1 − Rpt) = Wh,t+1 − RWh,t for h = 1, 2. Following Brock and
Hommes (1997, 1998), the proportion of “switching” traders at time t+ 1 is determined by
nh,t+1 =
exp [β (πh,t+1)]∑
i exp [β (πi,t+1)]
, h = 1, 2,
where parameter β is the intensity of choice measuring the switching sensitivity of the pop-
ulation of adaptively rational traders to the better profitable strategy. Together with (2.1), the
market fractions and asset price dynamics are determined by the following random discrete-time
dynamic system10
pt+1 = pt + µ(q1,t z1,t + q2,t z2,t) + δt, δt ∼ N (0, σ2δ ), (2.7)
ut = δut−1 + (1− δ) pt, (2.8)
vt = δvt−1 + δ (1− δ) (pt − ut−1)2 , (2.9)
mt = tanh
{
β
2
(z1,t−1 − z2,t−1) (pt +Dt − Rpt−1)
}
, (2.10)
Dt = D¯ + σDνt, νt ∼ N(0, 1), (2.11)
9 The long-run fundamental value is given by p∗ = (KD¯)/r, where KD¯ is the average annual dividend. Let
σp¯ be the annual volatility of the price p, where σ represents the annual volatility of one dollar invested in the
risky asset. Under independent price increments, the trading period variance of the price can be estimated as σ21 =
(p∗σ)2 /K . Denote by DA and σ2DA the annual dividend and its variance and assume an approximate relationship
DA = rp between annual dividend and price. Then one gets σ2DA = r
2(σp∗)2 and therefore σ2D = σ2DA/K =
r2(σp∗)2/K = r2σ21 . Assuming zero correlation between price and dividend at trading period frequency, one then
obtains V1,t (Rt+1) =
(
1 + r2
)
σ21 and V2,t (Rt+1) = σ21(1 + r2) + b2vt.
10Here the hyperbolic function tanh(x) is defined by tanh(x) = (ex − e−x)/(ex + e−x).
10
where z1,t and z2,t are given by (2.6). The fundamental price is assumed to follow a random
walk, such that11
p∗t+1 = p
∗
t exp(−
σ2ǫ
2
+ σǫǫt+1), ǫt ∼ N (0, 1), σǫ ≥ 0, p∗0 = p∗ > 0, (2.12)
where ǫt is independent of the noisy demand process δt. The corresponding deterministic model
can exhibit complicated price dynamics, which help us to understand the underlying mechanism
of the power-law behavior of the stochastic model. When there is no trader who switches
between the two strategies, the model developed in this paper reduces to the no-switching model
in He and Li (2015). We refer the reader to Dieci et al. (2006) for the complex price dynamics
and He and Li (2007, 2015) for a detailed discussion on the mechanism.
3. ESTIMATION OF THE POWER-LAW BEHAVIOR IN THE DAX 30
For the no-switching model, He and Li (2015) show that the autocorrelations (of returns, ab-
solute returns and squared returns) of the market fraction model share the same pattern as those
of the DAX 30. By conducting econometric analysis via Monte Carlo simulations, He and Li
(2015) characterize these power-law behaviors and find that estimates of the power-law decay
indices, the (FI)GARCH parameters, and the tail index of the estimated market fraction model
closely match those of the DAX 30. The results strongly support the explanatory power of the
heterogeneous agents models. For the extended model (2.7)-(2.12) with both fixed and switch-
ing traders, we are interested in the explanatory power of the adaptive behavior of investors in
financial markets. We follow the same estimation procedure as in He and Li (2015) and show
that the model with the switching is also able to explain the power-law behavior of the DAX
30. The finding provides a strong evidence on the rational switching and adaptive behavior in
financial markets.
After a brief discussion of the stylized facts of the DAX 30, including both fat tail and power-
law behavior, we introduce the calibration procedure to match the autocorrelation patterns in the
11The specification of the fundamental price process in (2.12) is to make sure that there are no significant ACs
in returns, absolute returns and squared returns in the fundamental price. Since the focus of the paper is on the
characteristics of returns, we also choose the fundamental price process p∗t defined in equation (2.12) to have an
expected mean return of zero. In general, the fundamental value is calculated from the dividend. For simplicity we
assume p∗t = KDt/r here. Therefore, we can impose the same random process (2.12) on the dividend, which is
equivalent to (2.12) on the fundamental price. The long-run fundamental value p∗ = (KD¯)/r defined in Footnote
9 only indicates a reference long-run fundamental value, which is chosen as the initial value of the fundamental
price process.
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returns, absolute and squared returns for the DAX 30, present the calibration result and conduct
an out-of-sample test. Based on the calibrated parameters for the model, we use Monte Carlo
simulations to examine the effectiveness of the calibration in generating the autocorrelation
patterns and estimating the decay indices of the power-law behavior, comparing the results with
those of the DAX 30. We also use the calibration result to examine the power-law tail behavior
of the model comparing with the DAX 30. We show that the calibrated model closely generates
the characterization of the power-law behavior of the DAX 30 in the return autocorrelation and
tails.
As in He and Li (2015), the price index data for the DAX 30 comes from Datastream, which
contains 8001 daily observations from 11 August, 1975 to 29 June, 2007. We use pt to denote
the price index for the DAX 30 at time t (t = 0, ..., 8000) with log returns rt defined by rt =
ln pt − ln pt−1 (t = 1, · · · , 8000)12. The summary statistics of rt for the DAX 30 show high
kurtosis and fat tails in rt, suggesting that rt is not normally distributed. The returns also show
volatility clusterings and time-varying market volatility. In addition, the returns contain little
serial correlation, but the absolute returns |rt| and the squared returns r2t do have significantly
positive and slow decaying serial correlation over long lags. This indicates the long-range
dependence or the power-law behavior in volatility for the DAX 30.13
3.1. Model Calibration and Result. As in He and Li (2015), to calibrate the power-law behav-
ior of the DAX 30 to our model, we minimize the average distance between the autocorrelations
of the log returns, the squared log returns, and the absolute log returns of the DAX 30 and the
corresponding autocorrelations generated from the models14. More precisely, denote Θ the pa-
rameter space of the model. Let θ ∈ Θ be the vector of parameters in the model to be calibrated,
N be the number of independent simulations of the model, β̂n be the estimated autocorrelations
of the n-th run of the model, and β̂DAX be that of the DAX 30. In calibration, we solve
θ̂ ∈ argminθ∈ΘDθ, Dθ := ‖
1
N
N∑
n=1
β̂n − β̂DAX‖2 (3.1)
12Note that, at daily frequency, the difference between log-returns and simple returns is very small.
13We refer He and Li (2015) for the detailed statistics, time series and autocorrelation plots.
14Note that we do not consider other moments such as scales of returns and absolute returns and others. By
exclusively focusing on the autocorrelations of return, squared return and absolute return, we provide a simple way
to gain insight into the generating mechanism of power-law behavior of volatility of the model.
12
for the standard Euclidian norm ‖ · ‖, using an asynchronous parallel pattern search algo-
rithm.15 The parameters in the model are chosen to lie in the following ranges:16 α ∈ [0, 1],
γ ∈ [0.05, 5.5], a1, a2 ∈ [0.001, 9.0], µ ∈ [0.1, 5], m0 ∈ [−1, 1], n0 ∈ [0.05, 0.995], δ ∈ [0, 1],
b ∈ [0.05, 8.5], β ∈ [0.5, 1.5], σε ∈ [0.005, 0.05], σ =
√
Kσε and σδ ∈ [0.05, 8.5]. However
p∗0 = p
∗ = 100, q = r2, and r = 0.05 are kept fixed. In the calibration and the subsequent
econometric analysis, we run 1,000 independent simulations over 9,000 time periods and dis-
card the first 1,000 time periods to wash out possible initial noise effect. For each run of the
model, we obtain 8,000 observations to match the sample size of the DAX 30. It is not possible
to use autocorrelations at all lags, so we focus on all lags until 50 and then each fifth lag up
to 10017. This corresponds to 60 autocorrelations in total for return, the absolute return and
squared return, respectively. Essentially, with 60 autocorrelations estimated for each of the rt,
r2t and |rt|, the dimension of β̂n and β̂DAX is 180 in total. The calibrated parameters of the
model are reported in Table 3.1.18
TABLE 3.1. The calibrated parameters of the models
α γ a1 a2 µ n0 m0 δ b σ σδ β
0.488 1.978 7.298 0.320 1.866 0.313 -0.024 0.983 3.537 0.231 3.205 0.954
We now provide an economic intuition of the calibrated result. Based on the calibrated pa-
rameters in Table 3.1, parameter no = 0.313 implies that, among two strategies, there are
some (about 31%) traders who do not change their investment strategies and many (about 69%)
traders who switch between two strategies with a switching intensity measured by β = 0.954.
15The software implementing the algorithm is APPSPACK 5.01; see more details in Gray and Kolda (2006), Griffin
and Kolda (2006), and Kolda (2005). In the implementation, to avoid possible local minima, we try different sets
of starting values, and for each set of starting value we search for the minimum and then we re-initialize and search
for the new minimum again. We repeat the procedure until there’s no further improvements.
16The parameter ranges for α,m0, no, δ are implied by the model specifications. The ranges for parameters
γ, a1, a2 and µ are selected to reflect reasonable behavior of the traders based on the analysis of the underly-
ing deterministic model in Dieci et al. (2006). The range for σǫ represents the volatility of the fundamental price,
while the range for σδ indicates the daily market price volatility level.
17We choose a large numbers of lags of ACs because our method of calibration of the model is exclusively focused
on the ACs, and it works well to produce reasonable results reported in Fig. 3.1. In practice, fewer lags may
contain the same information and too many lags would waste computation time and even affect the accuracy of
estimation; see, for instance, Franke and Westerhoff (2012) for related discussion.
18It is likely that the estimated parameter values can be different for differ indices over different time periods. In
fact, in our earlier exploratory model (He and Li, 2007, 2008, 2015 and Li et al., 2010) using other indices or
different periods of an index, the estimated model parameters are different in each of the cases. Quantitatively the
stylized facts can vary over time, however, qualitatively the main feature of the stylized facts remains the same
over long time periods and across different markets. It is this qualitative feature of the long memory pattern and
the generating mechanism provided in Section 4.1 that this paper contributes to the current literature. It is from
this perspective that the model estimation in this paper is robust.
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This is consistent with the empirical evidence of using fundamental and technical analysis and
the adaptive behavior of investors. With mo = −0.024, it indicates that, among those traders
who do not change their investment strategies, there are about equal numbers of trend followers
and fundamentalists. This result is different from the estimation of the market fraction model
of He and Li (2015) and the dominance of the trend followers without switching. These re-
sults demonstrate that both fundamentalists and trend followers are active in the market and
the market is populated with confident traders as well as adaptive traders. This is in line with
the findings from foreign exchange markets in Allen and Taylor (1990) and Taylor and Allen
(1992) and fund managers in Menkhoff (2010). The relatively higher a1 is than a2 implies that
the fundamentalists are more risk averse than the trend followers19. A value of α = 0.488 indi-
cates that the speed of price adjustment of the fundamentalists towards the fundamental value
is indicated by 1/(1 − α), which is about two trading periods. This may explain the frequent
deviations of the market price from the fundamental value in the short-run but not in the long-
run. A value of γ = 1.978 indicates that trend followers extrapolate the price trend, measured
by the difference between the current price and the geometric moving average of the history
prices, actively. Also note that γ = 1.978 > 1 does not lead to explosive expectations by trend
followers because of the quadratic volatility function in the denominator of the demand func-
tion. The geometric decay rate δ = 0.983 indicates a slow decaying weight. The parameter
b2 = bσ
2
1 measures the influence of the sample variance vt, in addition to the common belief
on the price volatility σ21 , to the estimated price volatility for trend followers. The value of
b = 3.537 implies that trend followers are cautious when estimating the price volatility, though
they are less risk averse. The annual return volatility of σ = 23.1% is close to the annual return
volatility of 19.67%(=
√
250 × 0.01244) for the DAX 30. A value of µ = 1.866 indicates
that the market maker actively adjusts the market price to the excess demand of the traders. A
positive σδ indicates that the noise traders are active in the market. In summary, the calibrated
parameters show that the market is dominated by traders who switch between the two strategies
based on their performance over time, although there are some traders who do not change their
19Note that, for simplicity, we assume that agents’ risk preferences switch when their strategies switch. Compared
to the trend followers who invest in short-run and are less risk averse, the fundamentalists invest in long-run and
are more risk averse in general. We see from Footnote 9 that trend followers have a systematically higher variance
estimate relative to the fundamentalists (by bvtσ21). When the additional term is much larger than (1 + r2)σ21 , the
trend followers have much higher risk perception, which also justifies the relative lower risk aversion of the trend
followers than the fundamentalists.
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strategies over time. Due to switching, the market becomes more volatile, which supports the
theoretical predication in Brock and Hommes (1998).
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FIGURE 3.1. (a) Autocorrelations of rt, r2t and |rt| for the model. (b) The ACs
of the returns, the squared returns and the absolute returns for the calibrated
model and the DAX 30. The smooth lines refer to the model while the 95%
confidence intervals are those for the DAX 30.
3.2. The Autocorrelation Patterns of the Calibrated Model and Out-of-Sample Test. As
in He and Li (2015), we want to know if the calibrated model is able to replicate the power-
law behavior of the DAX 30. Using the parameters in Table 3.1, we run 1,000 independent
simulations for the model and report the average ACs for returns, squared returns and absolute
returns. The resulting ACs plots in Fig. 3.1(a) show insignificant ACs for the returns, but
significantly positive and slowly decaying ACs over long lags for r2t and |rt|, very similar AC
patterns to the DAX 30. Further, the sample autocorrelations for the absolute returns are greater
than that for the squared returns at all lags up to at least 100 lags. Fig. 3.1(b) plots the ACs
of returns, the squared returns and the absolute returns for the model together with the DAX
30, respectively. For comparison, we use the Newey-West corrected standard error and plot the
corresponding 95% confidence intervals of the ACs of the DAX 30, showing that all of the ACs
of the model lie inside the confidence intervals of the DAX 30.
Different from He and Li (2015), here we perform an out-of-sample test to evaluate the
performance of the model. Recalling that we calibrated the model using the DAX 30 daily price
index from 11 August 1975 to 29 June 2007, we now use data from 02 July 2007 to 02 April
15
2015 and plot ACs for returns, squared returns and absolute returns of the DAX 30 together
with their 95% confidence intervals in Fig. 3.2. The ACs of returns and squared returns of
the calibrated model fit in the 95% confidence intervals of the DAX 30 reasonably well, but
the ACs of absolute returns of the calibrated model lie outside of the corresponding confidence
intervals of the DAX 30 after lag 30, which indicates that the persistence in volatility of the
DAX 30 is not as strong as before, since the global financial crisis. Overall, the out-of-sample
result indicates that the model performs reasonably well out of the sample and the calibration
method effectively captures the ACs patterns of the DAX 30.
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FIGURE 3.2. The ACs of the returns, the squared returns and the absolute re-
turns for the calibrated model and the DAX 30. The smooth lines refer to the
model while the 95% confidence intervals are those for the DAX 30 from 02
July 2007 to 02 April 2015.
Based on the calibrated parameters for the model, we use Monte Carlo simulations to examine
further the effectiveness of the calibration in estimating the decay indices of the power-law
behavior of ACs and in volatility clustering, comparing with those of the DAX 30. We also use
the calibration result to examine the power-law tail behavior of the model compared with the
DAX 30. The results show that the calibrated model closely generates the characterization of
the power-law behavior of the DAX 30 in the return autocorrelation, volatility clustering and
tails.20
3.3. A Comparison Test. To see how well the model is able to describe the characteristics in
the DAX 30, we follow He and Li (2015) and conduct the Wald test to see if the estimates based
20Since the results are consistent with the findings in He and Li (2015), we do not report them in detail.
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upon the calibrated model equal those of the DAX 30. In other words, for decay index d we test
the hypothesis
H0 : dDAX = d
using the Wald test statistic given by
W = (dˆDAX − dˆ)2/Σˆ,
where Σˆ is simply the variance of dˆDAX . The resulting test statistics are summarized in Table
3.2. In the column ‘rt’, the first sub-row reports the test statistics corresponding to dˆGPH , and
the second sub-row corresponding to dˆRH ,21 and so on. Notice that the critical values of the
Wald test at 5% and 1% significant levels are 3.842 and 6.635, respectively. For the returns,
we see that the estimated d of the DAX 30 and the model are significantly different. However,
for the squared returns and the absolute returns, the differences between the estimated d of the
DAX 30 and the model are not statistically significant. This result shows that the calibrated
model is able to describe the ACs of the absolute and squared returns in the DAX 30.
TABLE 3.2. The Wald test of d with m = 50, 100, 150, 200, 250
m 50 100 150 200 250
rt
19.41 45.62 61.94 65.86 76.35
35.41 92.24 126.0 117.5 129.4
r2t
0.071 1.309 0.282 0.036 0.023
0.037 1.246 0.050 0.767 0.276
|rt| 0.116 1.165 1.672 0.413 0.1950.020 0.350 0.067 0.031 0.015
4. MECHANISM EXPLANATION OF THE CALIBRATION RESULTS
We have shown that the calibrated model closely matches the stylized facts of the DAX
30. In this section, we explore the explanation on the generating mechanism of the power-law
behavior.
There are several explanatory mechanisms on volatility clustering based on the underlying
deterministic dynamics in HAM literature.22 The first one is based on the local stability and
21dˆGPH and dˆRH are two semiparametric estimators of the power-law decay index of autocorrelations depending
on bandwidth m; see He and Li (2015) for detailed discussions.
22Different from the mechanisms based on the deterministic dynamics, there are also other mechanisms on volatil-
ity clustering based on stochastic herding or stochastic demand (Alfarano et al. (2005) and Franke and Westerhoff
(2011)).
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FIGURE 4.1. The price of the deterministic model with the calibrated parameters.
Hopf bifurcation, explored in He and Li (2007). Essentially, on the parameter space of the
deterministic model, near the Hopf bifurcation boundary, the fundamental price can be locally
stable but globally unstable, depending on the initial values. Due to the nature of Hopf bifurca-
tion, such instability leads to periodic oscillations around the fundamental price. Then triggered
by fundamental noise and market noise, He and Li (2007) find that the interaction of fundamen-
talists, risk-adjusted trend chasing from the trend followers and the interplay of the noises and
the underlying deterministic dynamics can be the source of power-law behavior.
The second mechanism proposed in Gaunersdorfer et al. (2008) is characterized by the co-
existence of two locally stable attractors with different size. The interaction of the coexistence
of the deterministic dynamics and noise processes can then trigger the switching among the
two attractors and endogenously generate volatility clustering. Dieci et al. (2006) show that
the model developed in this paper can display such co-existence of locally stable fundamental
price and periodic cycle. More recently, He, Li and Wang (2016) further verify this endoge-
nous mechanism on volatility clustering of the model. Economically, they show that volatility
clustering occurs when neither the fundamental nor the trend following traders dominates the
market and when traders switch more often between the two strategies.
Mathematically, the model in this paper shares the same underlying deterministic mechanism
explored for a market fraction model without switching in He and Li (2007). For the correspond-
ing deterministic model with the calibrated parameters, the constant fundamental equilibrium
becomes unstable, leading to (a)periodical oscillation of the market price around the fundamen-
tal equilibrium, illustrated in Fig. 4.1. Triggered by random noise, such periodical deviations of
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the price from the fundamental value in the deterministic model are inherited in the stochastic
model. Fig. 4.2(a) plots the time series of typical market price and fundamental price of the
stochastic model. It shows that the price deviates from the fundamental price from time to time,
but, in general, follows the fundamental price. In addition, the returns of the stochastic model
display the stylized facts of volatility clustering in Fig. 4.2(b) and non-normality of return dis-
tribution in Fig. 4.2(c). Furthermore, with the two noise processes, Fig. 4.2(d) demonstrates
insignificant ACs for the returns, while Figs 4.2(e) and (f) show significant and decaying ACs
in the absolute and squared returns, respectively.23 They clearly demonstrate that, for the cali-
brated model, noise traders play an important role in the generation of insignificant ACs on the
returns, while the significant decaying AC patterns of the absolute returns and squared returns
are more influenced by the noisy fundamental process. These results are consistent with He and
Li (2007, 2015), and Chiarella, He and Hommes (2006).
Economically, this paper provides a different behavioral mechanism from He and Li (2015).
In He and Li (2015), a constant market fraction model is used to examine the potential mecha-
nism in generating power-law behavior in return autocorrelation patterns. The estimated param-
eters show that, with the dominance of trend followers (about 60%), the model is able to match
closely the power-law behavior of the DAX30. In this paper, the estimated parameters illustrate
different trading behavior. Essentially, the market is dominated by these traders (about 70%)
who consistently switch between two strategies. It is traders’ adaptive behavior that generates
the power-law behavior.
Given the different behavioral mechanisms, we want to know which mechanism is better.
Intuitively, with the flexibility of the model in this paper, we would expect the adaptive switch-
ing model, denoted SM, to fit the data better than the (no-switching) market fraction model,
denoted MF, of He and Li (2015), and the pure-switching model, denoted PSM, with n0 = 0
in line of Brock and Hommes (1998). In Appendix A, we provide the calibrated parameters in
Tab. A.1, the ACs patterns in Fig. A.1, and the Wald test for the PSM, which share the similar
results and implications to the SM. We calculate the distances of ACs, the D
θ̂
in Eq. (3.1),
between the DAX 30 and the SM, PSM, and MF models and obtain 4.56 and 4.59 and 4.63,
23We also plot the times series of price, fundamental value, returns, return distribution, the ACs of return, abso-
lute and squared returns with one noise, either the fundamental noise in Fig. B.1 or market noise in Fig. B.2,
respectively, in Appendix B.
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FIGURE 4.2. The time series of (a) the price (red solid line) and the fundamental
price (blue dot line) and (b) the return; (c) the return density distribution; the ACs
of (d) the returns; (e) the absolute returns, and (f) the squared returns.
respectively. The test statistics24 are 106, 108, and 112, respectively. These results seems to
confirm that the SM performs better than the PSM and MF models in terms of minimizing the
distance in Eq. (3.1) and the weighted average distance by taking into account the Ωˆ. However,
we would like to emphasize that the comparison is based upon the magnitudes of distances we
use. In other words, this is not to say that 4.56 (106) is significantly lower than 4.59 (108) and
24The test statistics (βˆDAX − βˆ)′Ωˆ−1(βˆDAX − βˆ) follow a Chi-square distribution with critical value 180 at the
5% significant level, where βˆ is estimated from the simulation model and Ωˆ−1 is the generalized inverse (see, for
example, Cameron and Trivedi, 2005) of corresponding covariance matrix, for ACs up to 50 lags for the return, the
squared return and the absolute return of the SM and PSM
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4.63 (112).25 A formal procedure such as that suggested by Hnatkovska et al., (2012) might be
explored further.26
5. CONCLUSION
Theoretically oriented HAMs have provided many insights into market behavior, such as
market booming and crashing, multiple market equilibrium, short-run deviation of market price
from the fundamental price and long-run convergence of the market price to the fundamental
price. Combined with numerical simulations, the HAMs are able to reproduce some stylized
fact, such as non-normality in return and volatility clustering. More recent developments in
HAMs have stimulated many interests in the generation mechanism of those stylized facts and,
in particular, power-law behavior. However, estimation and calibration of HAMs, in particular
the switching models, to the power-law behavior of financial data, together with some mecha-
nism explanation and economic intuition, are still a difficult and challenging task.
This paper calibrates an extended switching HAM to characterize the power-law behavior in
the DAX 30. The model considers a market populated by heterogeneous traders who use either
fundamental or chartist strategies. The market fractions of traders who use the two strategies
have both fixed and switching components. The calibration method is based on minimization
of the average distance between the autocorrelations (ACs) of the returns, the squared returns
and the absolute returns of the DAX 30 and the corresponding ACs generated from the model.
With the parameter values of the calibrated model, we show that the calibrated model matches
closely to the corresponding estimates for the DAX 30 and generates most of the stylized facts
observed in the DAX 30.
The calibration results support the empirical evidence in financial markets that investors and
fund managers use combinations of fixed and switching strategies based on various fundamen-
tal and technical analysis when making complicated investment decisions. By calibrating the
model to the daily DAX 30 index from 1975 to 2007, we show that the market is dominated
25We would like to thank one of the referees who pointed this out.
26It is possible to develop measures of goodness of fit. While the measures of goodness of fit are very useful when
comparing the performance of different HAMs (see, for example, Franke and Westerhoff, 2012), the comparison
results on various econometric characterizations between HAM and the actual data seem to imply that it might be
difficult to get meaningful test statistics. In our approach, the sampling error from the actual data is dealt with the
confidence intervals of the estimates and that from the simulation data is eliminated by running many independent
simulation. For a more general discussion on the comparison of the simulation models with the real world data,
see Li et al. (2006, 2010).
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by the adaptive investors who constantly switch between the fundamental and trend following
strategies, though there are some investors who never change their strategies over time. In ad-
dition, the calibrated model also provides a different behavioral explanation on the generating
mechanism of the power-law behavior in the literature. In conclusion, the calibration results
provide strong support to the explanatory power of heterogeneous agent models and the empir-
ical evidence of heterogeneity and bounded rationality.
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APPENDIX A. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF THE PURE SWITCHING MODEL
This Appendix provides calibration results of the pure switching model (2.7)-(2.12) with
no = 0 to characterize the power-law behavior of the DAX 30.
TABLE A.1. The calibrated parameters of the SW models
α γ a1 a2 µ δ b σ σδ β
0.513 0.764 7.972 0.231 2.004 0.983 3.692 0.231 3.268 0.745
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FIGURE A.1. (a) Autocorrelations of rt, r2t and |rt| for the SW model. (b) The
ACs of the returns, the squared returns and the absolute returns for the calibrated
SW model and the DAX 30. The smooth lines refer to the SW model while the
95% confidence intervals are those for the DAX 30.
TABLE A.2. The Wald test of d with m = 50, 100, 150, 200, 250
m 50 100 150 200 250
rt
18.92 44.73 61.61 66.17 77.30
34.99 91.16 125.7 118.6 132.0
r2t
0.068 1.247 0.263 0.034 0.026
0.035 1.272 0.038 0.694 0.234
|rt| 0.105 1.085 1.603 0.413 0.1980.024 0.331 0.064 0.031 0.016
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APPENDIX B. THE EFFECT OF ONE NOISE
This appendix demonstrates the impact of single noise in the model (2.7)-(2.12) on the AC
patterns of the return, absolute returns and squared returns.
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
130
t
P
 
 
p
p*
(a) The price and the fundamental price
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000
−0.01
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
t
r
(b) The return (r)
−0.015 −0.01 −0.005 0 0.005 0.01 0.015
0
50
100
150
r
 
 
Return
Normal
(c) The density of the return
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
lag
ACF(r)
(d) The ACs of the return
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
lag
ACF(|r|)
(e) The ACs of the absolute return
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
0
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.1
0.12
0.14
0.16
0.18
lag
ACF(r2)
(f) The ACs of the squared return
FIGURE B.1. The time series of (a) the price (red solid line) and the funda-
mental price (blue dot line) and (b) the return; (c) the density distribution of the
returns; the ACs of (d) the returns; (e) the absolute returns, and (f) the squared
returns, with the fundamental noise only (σδ = 0).
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FIGURE B.2. The time series of (a) the t price (red solid line) and the funda-
mental price (blue dot line) and (b) the return; (c) the density distribution of the
returns; the ACs of (d) the returns; (e) the absolute returns, and (f) the squared
returns, with the market noise only (σǫ = 0).
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